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REDRESS FOR A NO-WIN SITUATION:
USING LIQUIDATED DAMAGES IN COMPARABLE COACHES' CONTRACTS
TO ASSESS A SCHOOL'S ECONOMIC DAMAGE FROM THE Loss OF A

SUCCESSFL COACH
Richard T. Karcher*
This Essay addresses the difficulty of proving the financial harm that results
when a head coach departs a college or university during the contract term and
the institution thereby abruptly loses a valuable asset-a successful and stable
athletic program. Due to the unique and specialized nature of head coaches'
services and the industry in which they work, ordinary measures for assessing
damages based on substitute perjbrmance and transaction costs are insufficient.
This Essay offers a theory of measuring a university's damages within the
construct of a lost-income-producing-asset valuation, using a methodology
based on liquidateddamagesamounts in comparable coaches' contracts.
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INTRODUCTION

Three years ago, I wrote an article on the topic of the "coaching carousel" in
big-time college sports that laid the groundwork for establishing claims of
breach of contract and tortious interference when a successful head coach leaves
for another institution during the contract term and, in particular, for satisfying

*Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. I am grateful to the South Carolina Law
Review editors for their excellent editorial work as well as for their time-consuming and tedious
efforts in reviewing all of the contracts and verifying the accuracy of the data contained in my
compilation.
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the elements for obtaining injunctive relief due to the difficulty of ascertaining
the school's damages.'
While the school can seek a negative injunction to
prevent the coach from working for a competitor, the unanswered question from
my prior work, and the narrow issue presented in this Essay, is: How does the
school prove its financial loss if it elects to sue for damages instead of equitable
relief? I will concede the difficulty of ascertaining with a reasonable degree of
certainty the amount of financial harm that results when a school abruptly loses a
successful athletic program. However, because "liquidated damages" are an
accepted industry norm and are frequently used to remedy this particular type of
harm, it is difficult to fathom the notion that no financial harm actually results
or that the damages are merely "speculative."
Sport does not function and operate like a typical industry.4 It is a highly
specialized industry with its own set of unique rules, procedures, and wellestablished legal precedents. As such, it is often difficult to assess damages in
cases involving athletes, teams, and sports organizations using traditional
economic models and formulas based on substitute transactions, lost revenues,
6
and direct expenditures.
Damage calculations in sports cases require an
understanding of how the industry operates and assigns value to various
contractual rights and duties and income-producing intangible assets, as well as
an application of the industry's unique rules and legal framework to the
underlying facts and issues in each case.
This Essay offers a theory for measuring a school's damages for the loss of a
successful head coach during the contract term based on a model that uses
comparables to value the loss of an income-producing asset. Part II addresses
how the school is damaged due to the loss of the "unique" services provided by
head coaches-the primary difference between the university-coach relationship
and the typical employment relationship-as well as the loss of a successful and
stable athletic program. Part III proposes that a school's consequential damages
can reasonably be approximated with evidence of liquidated damage amounts in
comparable coaches' contracts and includes the author's damage calculation
using this methodology in the case of Mfarist College v. Brady.

1. See Richard T. Karcher, The Coaching Carousel in Big-Time Intercollegiate Athletics:
Econonic i~plicationsand Legal Considerations. 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
1 (2009).
2.
See id. at 58.
3.

See id. at 48 (citing MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION:

CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 372 (2d ed. 2009)).
4.
See generally Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 689 (2d Cir. 1995)
(discussing the uniqueness of the sport industry while addressing whether provisions of the National
Basketball Association's collective bargaining agreement would violate antitrust laws).
5. See id.
6.
See Karcher,supra note I, at 55-56.
7.
Marist Coll. v. Brady, Index No. 5006/2009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (decision and order
requiring parties to appear). As explained further herein, at the start of the trial, the judge granted
the coach's motion in limine to preclude Marist from presenting my damage calculation at trial. See
infra Part III.B.
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11. HOW THE SCHOOL Is DAIAGED
A.

Head Coaches 4re "Unique"

Head coaches are uniquely employed individuals. Head coaches are not
fungible and, therefore, are not easily replaceable, which makes them unlike the
vast majority of employees in the workforce. The head coach is also the "face"
of the athletic program; he receives much of the credit when the program is
successful and, conversely, significant blame when it is unsuccessful.
Head
coaches are unique because of their high-profile status and the local and national
media coverage they receive on a daily basis. Courts have even recognized
college head coaches in the sport of football as being unique.
Thus, universities view head coaches as the principal ingredient to having
and maintaining a successful athletic program.
These coaches impact the
recruitin and signing of the most talented student athletes-the key to
winning.
The head coach plays a critical role in this recruitment process, and
recruits often seek assurances that the coach will remain at the school for the
next few years. 14 These "schools obtain a competitive advantage in recruiting by
hiring and keeping the coaches who are the best recruiters,"15 which in turn
serves not only to increase a coach's market value but also to give the coach
leverage in negotiating a compensation package.1 6 Once an athletic program has
achieved success, as measured by the "win-loss" column, it puts the college or
university in a better position to continue to maintain that success because
winning has a positive effect on recruiting. 1 When a head coach leaves for
another university, such a departure raises questions in the minds of recruits
about the continuity of the program, as well as the university's commitment to

8. See Karcher, supra note 1, at 55.
9. See id. at 66.
10. See, e.g., id. at 24 27 (citations omitted) (discussing the termination and hiring of
Division I coaches).
11. See, e.g., Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo. 174 F.3d 751, 757 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that
head coach was hired for a "unique and specialized position" and holding that liquidated damages
provision was not an unenforceable penalty and university did not waive its right to liquidated
damages); New England Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. Univ. of Colo., 592 F.2d 1196, 1199 (ist
Cir. 1979) (noting that coach's services were considered "unique" in affirming preliminary
injunction enjoining university from hiring Patriots head coach who had five years remaining on his
contract).
12. See Karcher,supra note 1, at 33.
13. Id. at 46.
14. Id. at 72.
15. Id. at 46.
16. Id. at 47.
17. See id. at 33-34 (citing Steve Wieberg & Steve Berkowitz. NCAA Report: College Sports
Spending keeps Skvrocketing, USA TODAY (Apr. 29, 2009. 10:53 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.
com/sports/college/2009-04-29-college-athletic-spending-report N.htm).
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that program. 8 It can take two to three years, sometimes longer, for a
university's athletic program to achieve that success again.19
Because of their "uniqueness," when a head coach under contract abruptly
leaves the program, the university loses continuity in its coaching and stability in
its athletic program.20 The university's need for continuity and stability, as well
as the need to retain the coach's services for multiple years, reflects the coach's
uniqueness. The university maintains continuity in its coaching and stability in
its athletic program by making a large financial investment in the coach for a
multiyear term, and the university remains on the hook for that entire investment,
even if it terminates the coach because the program is unsuccessful. However,
due to the nature of the recruiting process-in addition to the necessity of
maintaining continuity and stability-it is neither practical nor feasible for the
industry to employ coaches at will. Instead, coaches are typically employed for
multiyear contract terms during which they are obligated to perform exclusively
for their respective universities in exchange for substantial guaranteed salaries
and a variety of performance bonuses and perks.
Exclusivity provisions are standard clauses in coaches' contracts that
provide that (1) the coach breaches the exclusivity provision if he unilaterally
terminates the contract and becomes employed as a head coach for another
university prior to the expiration of the contract term and (2) the other institution
tortiously interferes with the contract by instigating the breach.24 Unlike the
various professional sports leagues, the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) and its affiliated conferences have failed to adopt a "no tampering"
policy that would prohibit a coach under contract from seeking or accepting
other employment unless and until he has either been terminated or granted
permission to explore other employment opportunities.
In the absence of

18. See id. at 11-12 (citing Blair Kerkhoff, College Coaches Get Richer as Programs Try to
Trim Other Costs. KAN. CITY STAR (June 1, 2009), http://www.kansascity.com/sports/story/
1228663.html (quoting former Big 12 Conference Commissioner Dan Beebe) (accessed by
searching for Kerkhoff article in newspaper Archives database to purchase)).
19. See generally id at 53 (discussing the loss of stability that results from a coach's
departure).
20. See id. at 53, 66 (citing Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 174 F.3d 751. 755-56 (6th Cir.
1999)).

21. See id. at 33.
22. See id. at 71.
23. See id. at 3.
24. See id. at 68 (citing MITTEN ET AL., supra note 3, at 372).
25. See id at 72 (citing Robert H. Lattinville & Robert A. Boland, Coaching in the National
Football League: A llarket Survey and Legal Review, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 109, 132 (2006)).
For a discussion of the National Football League's (NFL's) no tampering policy and its
effectiveness in preventing and deterring coaches from breaching their contracts, see id at 73-77
(citations omitted). In 2011, the NFL extended its no tampering policy to college coaches by
requiring NFL clubs to seek permission from a school's athletic director prior to discussing
employment opportunities with, or hiring, any college coach. See Memorandum from NFL Comm'r
Goodell on Hiring of Coaches and Other College Personnel to Chief Execs., Club Presidents, Gen.
Managers, and Head Coaches (Jan. 20, 2011) (on file with author).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss2/7

4

Karcher: Redress for a No-Win Situation: Using Liquidated Damages in Compa
2012]

REDRESS FOR A No-WIN SITUATION

433

internal league rules that deter and prevent breach and tortious interference, a
university must file suit against the coach and the interfering institution to
recover its damages.26
B. A Loss of Continuity in Its Coaching and a Loss of Stability Results in
"Foreseeable"Economic Damage
Schools justify making substantial financial commitments to a coach "on the
basis that [the] coach's compensation is an investment that yields a monetary
return" in the form of, among other things, "increased ticket sales, marketing and
sponsorship revenue, donations," apparel sales, and an increase in the quantity
and quality of admissions applications. The high-profile nature of college head
coaching and the revenue that the sports generate through ticket sales, licensing,
merchandising, and donations form the basis for a university's decision both to
guarantee a coach's annual compensation for a multiyear term and to pay the
coach substantial bonuses as a reward for the team's achievements each season.2
Athletic programs are typically viewed as the "front door" of the college or
university, and they play a major role in higher education in the United States.
More specifically, universities justify the compensation paid to their head
football and men's basketball coaches with the revenue these two sports generate
in comparison to all other sports.30
As stated above, the economic damage to the university due to the departure
of a head coach before the expiration of his contract term can be characterized as
a loss of continuity in its coaching and loss of stability in its athletic program,
which results in a lost opportunity for the university to benefit from a successful

26. See, e.g., Karcher, supra note 1, at 51-52 (discussing the settlement between the
University of West Virginia and Rich Rodriguez and the University of Michigan).
27. Id. at 27; see also Devin G. Pope & Jaren C. Pope, Understanding College Application
Decisions: fhv College Sports Success Aatters, J. SPORTS ECON. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1,
18), available at http://jse.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/05/08/1527002512445569 (finding that
success in college sports has a large impact on student application decisions such that certain
demographic groups-e.g., males, Blacks, out-of-state students, and students who played sports in
high school-are more likely to be influenced by sports success than their counterparts); see also
Devin G. Pope & Jaren C. Pope, The Impact of College Sports Success on the Quantity and Quality
of Student Applications, 75 S. EcoN. J. 750. 776 (2009) (findings include: (1) football and
basketball success significantly increases the quantity of applications to a school; (2) private schools
see increases ir application rates after sports success that are two-to-four times higher than public
schools: (3) the extra applications received are composed of both low and high SAT scoring
students, thus providing potential for schools to improve their admission outcomes; and (4) schools
appear to exploit these increases in applications by improving both the number and the quality of
incoming students).
28. See Karcher, supra note 1, at 27-31 (citations omitted) (discussing the hires of Nick
Saban at the University of Alabama and John Calipari at the University of Kentucky).
29. See id. at 27.
30. See id.
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and stable program.3 1 The damage, then, consists of the value of the loss of the
coach for the remainder of the contract term, including the loss of a successful
and stable program, which is, itself, akin to an income-producing asset. Due to
the specialized services head coaches provide and the fact that they are not
fungible, a substitute transaction is neither feasible nor practical as a damages
calculation.
Thus, the formula normally used to measure damages when an
employee breaches an employment agreement-the employer's cost to procure
substitute services -is inadequate because the "market value" of the coach's
lost services cannot be measured against that of the substitute services.
Moreover, the substitute-transaction measure of damages does not account
for the economic damage to the university in the form of a lost incomeproducing asset and a lost opportunity-known in contract law as consequential
damages-which were reasonably foreseeable to the coach when he contracted
with the university. The rule for recovery of consequential damages, laid down
in the seminal case of Hadley v. Baxendale,- is that damages are recoverable for
only a loss that was known to, or reasonably foreseeable by, the party in breach
at the time the contract was made.3 The foreseeability doctrine operates to give
the contracting parties an incentive to allocate risk before the breach occurs,
38
namely, at the time of contract formation.
Contract principles operate as

31. See id. at 56. For a study on the coaching carousel's impact on a college football player's
NFL draft prospects, see Philip L. Hersch, Does the NCAA Coaching Carousel Hamper the
Professional Prospects of College Football Recruits?, 13 J. SPORTS ECON. 20, 28 (2012) (noting
that regression results indicate that, for players drafted, a coaching change drops the average
draftee's position nearly two thirds of a round, potentially costing the player hundreds of thousands
of dollars in guaranteed money).
32. See Karcher,supra note I, at 56.
33. See id. at 55.
34. See id. (quoting Judson Graves. Commentary, Coaches in the Courtroom: Recovery in
Actions for Breach ofEmployment Contracts, 12 J.C. & U.L. 545, 548-49 (1986)).
35. See id. at 56; see also Dinicu v. Groff Studios Corp., 690 N.Y.S.2d 220, 224 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1999) (In cases presenting "some special, if not unique, features which [make] the
ascertainment of damages a difficult task," the plaintiff "is not restricted to the ordinary rules for
measuring damages or obliged to prove its losses with mathematical certainty or accuracy."
(quoting Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Ohrbach's. Inc., 56 N.Y.S.2d 173, 179 (N.Y. App. Div.
1999))).
36. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145; 9 Ex. 341.
37. See id. at 151; 9 Ex. at 355-56 (holding that damages based on lost profits were not
foreseeable to the defendant common carrier who entered into a contract with plaintiff grain miller
to deliver a broken crankshaft to another party for repairs by a certain date where delivery failed to
occur on time, which resulted in lost business for the plaintiff and a resulting breach of contract
claim against the carrier for the recovery of lost profits); see also Susi v. Simonds, 85 A.2d 178. 179
(Me. 1951) ("[f]or the plaintiff to recover the special damages which he here claims to have
suffered beyond what would naturally flow from the breach claimed of such contract, it must
aftirmatively appear that the special circumstances under which the contract was actually made
which gave rise to such damages were communicated by the plaintiff to the defendant and were thus
in the contemplation of both parties at the time of making the contract." (citing Hadley, 156 Eng.
Rep. at 145, 9 Ex. at 341; Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y.489 (1858))).
38. See Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151, 9 Ex. at 354.
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default rules in the absence of express provisions, and contracting parties are,
therefore, Aenerally free to contract around damage rules inder certain
conditions.
To avoid incurring the inconvenience and expense of litigation upon a
coach's breach of the exclusivity provision, the prevailing industry trend is for
universities and coaches to contract around the default consequential damages
rules b quantifying, or "liquidating," their damages at the time the contract is
made. 4 A "buyout"-the term the industry often uses to describe the transaction
that results when a coach leaves one institution for another-is, in actuality,
nothing more than a triggered liquidated damages clause; it is an amount of
money owed to a nonbreaching party for damages caused by the breaching
party) 1
Liquidated damages clauses commonly provide that the coach
acknowledges that his services are unique, that his promise to work for the entire
contract term is the essence of the agreement, and that the university's
substantial investment would be lost if the coach were to terminate his
employment before the end of the term.42 In essence, the liquidated damages are
covering the university's consequential damages resulting from the coach's
breach.
However, contract law provides that any amount of liquidated damages
cannot exceed a figure "that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual
loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss." 43 Thus, two
requirements for the enforceability of a liquidated damages clause are that (1)
actual damages be difficult to prove and (2) the liquidated damages be
reasonable at the time of drafting the contract. 44 Some courts have imposed an
additional requirement that there not be a "wide disparity" between the
liquidated damages and the actual loss, measured post-breach.
If the court

39.

See 24 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A 'TREATISE ON THE LAW OF

CONTRACTS § 65:1 (4th ed. 2002) ("Under the fundamental principle of freedom of contract, the
parties to a contract have a broad right to stipulate in their agreement the amount of damages
recoverable in the event of a breach, and the cowls will generally enforce such an agreement, so
long as the amount agreed upon is not unconscionable, is not determined to be an illegal penalty
and is not otherw ise violative of public policy." (footnotes omitted)).
40. See discussion infra Part 111.13 and app. (detailing research showing that thirty-six out of
the fifty-five coaching contracts analyzed contained liquidated damages provisions).
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. a (1981).
42. See Martin J. Greenberg, College Coaching Contracts Revisited: A PracticalPerspective,
12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 127, 247-48 (2001).
43.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 356(1).

44. See id.
45. See, e.g., Kimbrough & Co. v. Schmitt, 939 S.W.2d 105, 109 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)
("[A] wide disparity between the stipulated damage amount and actual damages may indicate that a
damage forecast was unreasonable . . . ."), overruled on other grounds by Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc.,
995 S.W.2d 88, 99-100 (Tenn. 1999).
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finds the damages amount excessive, it may deem the liquidated damages clause
unenforceable as a "penalty" and strike it down accordingly.'4
The damages amounts pursuant to liquidated damages clauses in coaches'
contracts are typically either (1) a stipulated dollar amount or (2) based upon a
formula tied to the coach's base salary, multiplied by the number of years
remaining on the contract term as of the time of the breach.47 Therefore, by
agreeing to a payment formula in advance, the parties are negotiating a buyout
price for the coach, up front, in the event he breaches the exclusivity provision of
the contract. Additionally, because the liquidated damages amount owed to the
university when a coach leaves before the expiration of the term is often paid by
the new institution,4 8 the recovered amount may be viewed as payment for
damages caused by its tortious interference with contractual relations.
What if a coach breaches the exclusivity provision in his contract and the
parties have not contracted around the default damages rules by agreeing to a
liquidated damages amount? While liquidated damages clauses are viewed as a
reasonable attempt to measure the anticipated economic loss to the university in
the event of a coach's breach, the law certainly does not require parties to
include such a provision in the contract, nor does it preclude nonbreaching
parties from recovering their actual losses in the absence of a liquidated damages
clause.49 A sentiment seems to exist that if the school and coach do not include a
liquidated damages clause, then the coach is "free to leave" without having to
compensate the school for the breach.5o However, a contract that omits a
liquidated damages clause cannot be construed as the parties' intent or agreement
to contract around the default damages rules; construing the intent of the
parties in such a manner would render the exclusivity clause superfluous. If the
parties intend to allow the coach to leave without compensation, the proper way
to contract around the default damages rules is to omit the exclusivity provision

46. See RESTATEMEMNT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) ("A term fixing unreasonably
large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty.").
47. See Greenberg, supra note 42, at 248-51 (providing specific examples of liquidated
damages provisions in coaching contracts); see also Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 174 F.3d 751,
757 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[U]sing the number of years left on the contract multiplied by the salary per
year was a reasonable way to calculate damages considering the difficulty of ascertaining damages
with certainty.").

48. Karcher, supra note I, at 48 (citing MITTEN ET AL., supra note 3, at 372).
49. See, e.g., My Bread Baking Co. v. Jesi, 214 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Mass. 1966) (allowing a
norbreaching party to recover their actual loss despite the absence of a liquidated damages clause);
Frank D. Wayne Assocs., Inc. v. Lussier, 454 N.E.2d 109, III (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (noting that in
the absence of a liquidated damages clause, appropriate damages for breach of a noncompete
contract may be the value of lost profits to the plaintiff employer).
50. See Greenberg, supra note 42, at 248.
51. See Karcher, supra note 1, at 89; see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory ofDefault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 115 (1989) ("Parties
who dislike a given default rule will contract around it."). By omitting a liquidated damages clause,
the parties have not contracted around the default damages rules. Therefore, the "[d]efault rules
[will] fill the gaps in [the] incomplete contract[]." Id. at 87.
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that obligates the coach to perform services solely for the university for the
length of the contract term. 52
In the absence of a liquidated damages clause, the university must prove its
damages, which requires it to overcome two hurdles. The first hurdle is the
foreseeability rule for recovery of consequential damages. 5 3 Its application
suggests that when the multiyear guaranteed contract is executed, the head coach
is well aware that his breach during the contract term, at a time when the athletic
program is typically successful, would cause some economic loss beyond those
direct and indirect costs incurred in finding a replacement. It is reasonably
foreseeable to the coach that his breach would cause an immediate loss of
recruits and a lasting difficulty on the program's ability to attract talented student
athletes.5
In addition, it would have a detrimental impact on tickets,
broadcasting, donations, and other sources of revenues .
Moreover, it is
reasonably foreseeable to the coach that his breach will force the university and
its newly-hired replacement coach to do everything possible to turn the program
around and return it to the level of success that had been attained by the previous
coach before his departure. The extent or magnitude of the economic loss that is
reasonably foreseeable varies, however, depending upon the particular school,
sport, level of competition, and conference.5 For instance, the University of
South Carolina and Clemson University football programs are likely to incur a
greater economic loss than the basketball programs at Marist College and James
Madison University.
The second hurdle is a general rule of limitation; damages-including
consequential damages for breach of contract-must be determined with
"reasonable certainty.", This rule presents a challenge for plaintiffs in any case
involving lost opportunity and lost profits because such determinations
necessarily entail projections and predictions about future business prospects.58
Nevertheless, reasonable certainty does not equate to absolute or complete

52. If the parties omit the exclusivity provision, the coach cannot be found to have breached
the contract for leaving before the expiration of the contract term. Thus, the university would not be
entitled to compensation for damages caused by the coach's departure.
53. See Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151; 9 Ex. 341, 354.
54. See Ne. Univ. v. Brown. 17 Mass. L. Rptr. No. 19, 443, 444 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 11.
2004). The court granted an interim injunction preventing Northeastern University's head football
coach, who was in the first year of a six-year contract, from accepting an offer to coach at the
University of Massachusetts (U. Mass.). Id. at 445. The court focused on the competitive
disadvantage to Northeastern and found that Northeastern and U. Mass. compete with each other for
recruits. Id. at 444.
55. See Karcher, supra note 1, at 27.
56. Compare infra app. (listing different liquidated damages provisions for various men's
college basketball coaches) with Karcher, supra note I, at 51-52 (detailing the liquidated damages
provisions in college football coach Rich Rodriguez's contracts at West Virginia and Michigan).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1981); see also RESTATEMEVNT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 (1979) (noting that to recover, a tort victim must establish damages
"with as much certainty as the nature of the tort and the circumstances permit").
58.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
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certainty,59 and mathematical precision is not required in cases where such
exactitude is not attainable.60 A reasonable approximation of the value of the
lost income-producing asset or lost opportunity can be determined even if lost
profits cannot be quantified with certainty.61 The Restatement (Second) of Torts
describes a situation in which the defendant has tortiously interfered with the
plaintiffs entering into or continuing a business enterprise or business
transaction, which entails "not only the likelihood of profit but also a chance for
loss."62 To recover lost profits, the plaintiff must prove that the enterprise or
transaction "was or was likely to be profitable and that the chance for profits has
been interfered with."63 As an illustration, the Restatement provides the
following example of a business transaction involving tortious interference with
a contract to promote a boxing match:
A has a contract with B by the terms of which A is to arrange for a
boxing match between B and C. D tortiously causes B to break his
contract before A has incurred any expenses with reference to it. A is
entitled to compensatory damages from D only if he proves that it is
more probable than not that the match would have been made by him

59. See Felder v. Physiotherapy Assocs., 158 P.3d 877, 886 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) ("As the
comment to the Restatement recognized ... it is desirable that 'an injured person not be deprived of
substantial compensation merely because he cannot prove with complete certainty the extent of
harm he has suffered.') (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 cmt. a); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 cmt. a ("Damages need not be calculable with mathematical
accuracy and are often at best approximate.").
60. Dinicu v. Groff Studios Corp., 690 N.Y.S.2d 220, 224 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (quoting
Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Ohrbach's, Inc., 56 N.Y.S.2d 173, 179 (N.Y. App. Div. 1945));
see also Frank D. Wayne Assocs, Inc. v. Lussier. 454 N.E.2d 109. 111 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983)
(quoting Kroeger v. Stop & Shop Cos., 432 N.E.2d 566 (1982)) (citing Smith v. Brovn. 42 NE.
101 (Mass. 1895)) (noting that "quantifying the consequences of violating a non-competition clause
is a particularly difficult and elusive one," and therefore "mathematical accuracy of proof is not
required, and estimates are in order"); Fera v. Vill. Plaza, Inc., 242 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Mich. 1976)
(quoting Godwin v. Ace Iron & Metal Co.. 137 N.W.2d 151. 156 (Mich. 1965)) (in reinstating jury
award for lost profits involving a new business with no past earning history on which to base anl
estimate of future earnings, court noted that mathematical precision is not required where precision
is unattainable particularly when "it is [the] defendant's own act or neglect" that has created the
problem).
61. See, e.g., Air Tech. Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 199 N.E.2d 538, 548 (Mass. 1964) ("The
problem is to determine the value of that opportunity to which AT was entitled as a contract right,
even ifAT's lost profits cannot be ascertained. A reasonable approximation will suffice."); see also
Snow v. Villacci, 2000 ME 127, 754 A.2d 360, 365 (2000) (acknowledging that recovery of
prospective, hypothetical earnings presented special evidentiary challenges and holding that a
plaintiff may recover damages based on lost earning opportunity if supported by an adequate
evidentiary foundation).
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 cmt. d.
63.

Id.
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and would have been a financial success, and if his proof offers a
reasonable basis for estimating the profits.64
In the example above, A must first prove that D's wxrongful conduct did in
fact cause A a loss of the opportunity to earn money.65 Second, A must prove the
amount of that loss to a reasonable degree of certainty. In other words, there
must be a reasonable probability, as opposed to a mere possibility, that the
plaintiff suffered damage from the defendant's actions, and there must be
evidence, not just speculation, that provides a reasonable estimate of the amount
of such damage. However, when consequential damages for breach involve a
lost income-producing asset that was in the plaintiffs possession prior to the
breach-such as the loss of a successful and stable athletic programdetermining the value of the asset is inherently less speculative than proving the
amount of lost profits because such a determination represents a value calculated
at a single point in time and not contingent on the realization of profits that have
not yet materialized.

67

III. HowTo REASONABLY APPROXIMATE A SCIOOL'S DAMAGES
A.

Using Comparable Coaches' Contracts as Evidence to Assess the
Amount ofDamages

In cases involving unique businesses and individuals, it is especially difficult
to quantify economic damages resulting from breaches.68 When assessing the
value of a lost income-producing asset or a lost business opportunity pertaining
to a unique business, courts often allow evidence and expert testimony
concerning values, profit histories, and sales of comparable assets, businesses,
agreements, and transactions.69 As one court noted, values of intangible assets,

64. Id § 912 cnt. d. illus. 8.
65. Id. § 912 cmt. a ("When one seeks to recover damages ... he has the burden of
proving ... that the act of the other was a legal cause of the harm.").
66. Id ("It is desirable that responsibility for harm should not be imposed until it has been
proved with reasonable certainty that the harm resulted from the wrongful conduct of the person
charged. It is desirable, also, that there be definiteness of proof of the amount of damage as far as is
reasonably possible.").
67. See Schonfeld v. 1illiard, 218 F.3d 164, 177 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that loss of supply
agreements "was clearly within the contemplation of all the parties" when the defendants entered
into the agreement to provide funding, which was subsequently breached, because the funding
agreement that was breached was entered into for the purpose of securing the supply agreements).
68. Karcher, supra note 1. at 50 (quoting Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo. 174 F.3d 751. 757
(6th Cir. 1999)).
69. See, e.g., Schonfild, 218 F.3d at 178 (noting that "market value of unique or intangible
assets" may be determined based on an expert's "opinion of the asset's value" and "evidence of
sales of comparable assets" when no sales history is available); Sarrouf v. New England Patriots
Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1122, 1127, 1128 (Mass. 1986) (noting the uniqueness of sports
teams from other business ventures, court held that the trial judge was entitled to use evidence of
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such as music licenses, television show formats, mineral rights, and literary
characters, may be established by experts based upon references to values
established by other agreements and comparable assets."0
Comparable coaches' contracts can be used to assess a university's lost
opportunity to benefit from a successful athletic program as a result of a head
coach's breach of an exclusivity provision, as well as a concurring tortious
interference with his contract by the institution seeking to hire the coach. A
reasonable approximation of a university's damages can be established by
reference to, and analysis of, the liquidated damages amounts that (1) are
contained in the contracts of head coaches (a) in the same sport, (b) at
comparable schools, and (c) with comparable salaries, and (2) would have been
paid to the school had the comparable coach left in the same year of the contract
term in which the breaching coach left. I base the relevance and reliability of
such evidence on three assumptions.
First, it can be assumed that this evidence is the best available under industry
standards. The college coaching industry frequently uses and relies upon
liquidated damages clauses to assess a university's damages to a reasonable
degree of certainty for the loss of a head coach for the remainder of the contract
term; the damages include the lost opportunity to profit from a successful
program that would result both directly and indirectly from a head coach's
services.
A substantial number of head coaches' contracts in Division I men's
basketball programs and Football Bowl Subdivision programs contain liquidated
damages clauses, the purpose and function of which is to protect the university
from the coach's departure.7 2
Second, it can be assumed that universities and coaches will be rational
economic actors when measuring the foreseeable damage to the school pursuant

"prices paid for new franchises as a starting point in his valuation of the net assets of the [New
England Patriots Football Club]" for purposes of ascertaining the fair value of its stock in an
appraisal proceeding): see also Felder v. Physiotherapy Assocs., 158 P.3d 877, 887-88 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2007) (In addressing what constitutes "reasonable certainty" in the determination of damages
for the lost opportunity in a sports career, the court stated that the amount may be "supported by the
best evidence available and the essential consideration is that 'the jury must be guided by some
rational standard," wvhich included evidence concerning the economics of baseball compensation,
the length of'a career, "and what similar players were being paid." (quoting Short v. Riley, 724 P.2d
1252, 1255 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986))); Doe v. McFarlane, 207 S.W.3d 52, 69 70 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006)
("[T]he Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition recognizes that expert testimony concerning the
licensing fees paid to similarly situated persons for comparable uses is relevant to determine the fair
market value of a defendant's unauthorized use of a plaintiff s name in a right of publicity case.").
70. Schonfeld, 218 F.3d at 178; see also Cent. Dover Dev. Corp. v. Town of Dover, 680
N.Y.S.2d 668, 669 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (assessing market value of sand and gravel deposits
based upon a separate lease for the right to remove such deposits).
71. See Karcher, supra note I, at 49 50 (quoting DiNardo, 174 F.3d at 755-57).
72. For example, in my review of comparable contracts for the Marist case, a majority
(thirty-six out of fifty-five) of the head men's basketball coaches' contracts at mid-major, Division I
colleges and universities contained a liquidated damages clause. See discussion oifra Part III.B and
app.
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to an agreed upon liquidated damages amount or formula.
According to the
economic theory of contracts. parties to a contract will behave as rational
economic actors when negotiating and agreeing upon terms and conditions of a
transaction." Both the university and the coach are very knowledgeable about
the market for coaches' services, and they rely on the advice and counsel of
retained search consultants, agents, and lawyers.
Because the market for
coaches' services is highly competitive, when a university and coach agree to
stipulate the school's damages, it can be assumed that the parties will lack the
incentive to agree to an amount that is unreasonable, inefficient, or both. 6 When
determining liquidated damage amounts and formulas, universities and coaches
take into account such factors as (1) the number of years in the contract term, (2)
the coach's total guaranteed compensation for the entire contract term, (3) the
athletic department's budget and the level of competition at which the particular
athletic program participates, and (4) the extent and scope of foreseeable damage
to the university depending upon when the coach commits a breach during the
contract term.
If one assumes that compensation amounts are determined by
market forces based upon comparable coaches' contracts, then it can also be

73. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological
Experiment 108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 636 (2010) ("When parties stipulate damages, they clarify the
respective expectations of the parties, permitting efficient breach without repudiation of the mutual
understanding.").
74. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract
Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 687 (1986) ("The [economic] claim posits that since people
respond to legal rules in ain 'economic' fashion, one may use economic theory to predict the
behavior of people in response to particular legal rules.").
75. See Karcher, supra note 1, at 41-42 (quoting Libby Sander & Paul Fain, Coaches'
Contracts Are Fertile Groundfor Conflict, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June 4. 2009), http://chronicle.
com/article/coaches-contracts-aire-fertile/44424/) (citing Brian Curtis, The Kingmnakers: Part H:
Agents Playing an Ever Greater Role in the Hiring of College Coaches, CSTV.COM (Jan. 30, 2008),
http://www.csty.com/sports/m-footbl/stories/01 3 008aag.html).
76. See Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 73, at 645 ("[Wiihen a competitive market exists, parties
have no incentive to sign a socially inefficient contract (like a contract with a penalty clause)."
(citing Kathryn E. Spier & Michael D. Whinston, On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated
Damagesfor Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers,Reliance, and Renegotiation, 26 RAND J. ECON.
180, 198 (1995) ("[Wiith a competitive entrant, the buyer and seller not only have an incentive to
sign a socially efficient contract, but can also achieve the first best using a relatively simple
stipulated damage contract that sets damages equal to the efficient expectation damage."))).
77. Cf id at 646-47 ("When parties specify the amount of damages in the event of breach as
part of a contract, they may be forced to do some cost-benefit calculations that they would have
otherwise neglected.... [I]t asks parties to think about fair compensation for breach at a time when
they are not inclined toward punishment for the moral outrage of breaking a promise."); Tess
Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in Breach of Contract,6
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405, 415-17 (2009) (finding that study subjects were inclined to set the
penalty for breach at a lower amount when they were asked to draft a liquidated damages clause
than wvhen they were asked, ex post, to determine the appropriate level of damages for breach and
arguing that the difference between negotiating for the penalty in the event of breach and deciding
on a penalty after the fact has to do with the salience of the moral harm and assigning blame).
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assumed that stipulated damage amounts reflect the going "market rate" for
liquidated damages.78
Lastly, no court has struck down a liquidated damages provision in a coach's
contract. To the contrary, one court that addressed the legality of a liquidated
damages provision in the contract of a head football coach found it to be
reasonable and enforceable.7 Therefore, a third assumption can be made that
the liquidated damages clauses contained in comparable coaches' contracts are
valid, binding, and legally enforceable obligations that would be construed as
reasonable in relation to the anticipated damages and not as an unenforceable
penalty. It would be illogical for an entire industry, as well as courts of law, to
recognize liquidated damages provisions as a reasonable method of assessing
what is acknowledged to be difficult-to-ascertain economic harm. but to then
suggest that such evidence is not reliable or relevant in assessing damages
incurred by a comparable university resulting from a comparable breach
committed by a comparable coach.
The next section demonstrates the
methodology.
B. Assessing Damages in the Marist Case
I was retained as an expert by Marist College after its head men's basketball
coach, Matthew Brady, left for James Madison University (JMU) during the first
year of a nearly four-year contract term.s Marist requested that I assess the
range of damages resulting from Brady's breach of contract and JMU's tortious
81
interference with Brady's contract.
Brady's contract with Marist contained a
standard exclusivity clause providing that Brady "shall devote all of his time,

78. Universities and coaches reach market rates for compensation according to wlat
comparable institutions pay comparable coaches. See, e.g.. Terms of Employment, dated November
28, 2011, between The Ohio State University and Urban Meyer, CSTV.coM, http://grfx.cstv.com/
photos/schools/osu/sports/m-footbl/autopdf 2011-12/misc non event/ 112811-fb-contract.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 12, 2012) ("In concluding this agreement, the university undertook certain benchmarking
of comparable contracts.").
79. See Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 174 F.3d 751, 757 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[U]sing the
number of years left on the contract multiplied by the salary per year was a reasonable way to
calculate damages considering the difficulty of ascertaining damages with certainty."). In affirming
the district court's judgment against the coach for $281,886.43, an amnount based upon the coach's
base salary that was initially set at $100,000, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the coach
was hired for "a unique and specialized position" and that the potential damage to the university
from his resignation extended "beyond the cost of hiring a replacement coach." Id. at 756, 757.
80. E.g., Affirmation in Opposition to Brady's Motion in Limine Regarding Expert
Testimony if 3, 43, 45, Marist Coll. v. Brady, Index No. 5006/2009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 26, 2012)
[hereinafter Opposition to Motion in Limine] (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
81. RICHARD T. KARCHER, ANALYSIS OF DAMAGES INCURRED BY MARIST COLLEGE BY
REASON OF THE Loss OF MATTHEW BRADY FOR THE REMAINDER OF HIS CONTRACT TERM 1

(2011) [hereinafter ANALYSIS OF DAMAGES] (on file with South Carolina Law Review); see also
Verified Complaint, Marist Coll. v. Brady, Index No. 5006/2009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 7, 2009)
[hereinafter Marist's Verified Complaint] (on file with South Carolina Law Review) (outlining
Plaintiff s causes of action and version of the facts).
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attention, knowledge and skill solely and exclusively to the position for which
the College has hired [him]."
The contract further provided that Brady "may
not enter into discussions with another college, university or professional
basketball organization regarding a coaching position unless he receives prior
written permission of the Marist College Athletic Director" and "may not
accept another basketball coaching position unless it is mutually agreeable to the
College and [Brady]." 8
In his four seasons at Marist, Brady had an overall record of 73-50 (45-27
conference record), including a first-place finish in the Metro Atlantic Athletic
Conference (MAAC) in the 2006-2007 season.
Marist also advanced to the
National Invitation Tournament (NIT) in 2007, where it defeated Oklahoma
86
State in the first round.
This win during Brady's tenure was the first-ever
postseason victory for Marist8 That year (2007), Marist extended Brady's
contract for a three-year, nine-month term "providin a guaranteed annual salary
of $200,000 plus numerous performance incentives.
Following the 2007-2008 season, with three years remaining on his new
contract term,8 Brady left Marist for JMU,o thereby breaching the exclusivity
provision in his contract. 91 JMU announced the hiring of Brady as its new head
men's basketball coach on March 25, 2008.' The basketball program at Marist
experienced consecutive losing seasons subsequent to Brady's breach. The
team's overall record in 2008-2009 was 10-23 (4-14 conference record, secondto-last-place finish); in 2009-2010 was 1-29 (1-17 conference record, last-

82. Contract of Employmnent Between Marist College and Matthew Brady 8 (July 1, 2007)
[hereinafter Brady Marist Contract Extension] (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
83. Id. at 9.
84. Id.
85. Matt Brady Biography,JMUSPORTS.COM, http://wvw.jmusports.comi/View Article.dbml?
DBOEM ID=14400&ATCLTD= 1420099 (last visited Oct. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Matt Brady Bio].
86. Id.
87. Mike Ferraro, Red Fox Basketball Puts 1ariston the Map, MARIST MAGAZINE. Summer
2007, at 8, available at http://www.narist.edu/alunmi/magazine/pdfs/magazineO7.pdf.
88. ANALYSIS OF DAMAGES, supra note 81, at 6-7 (citing Brady Marist Contract Extension,
supra note 82).
89. Opposition to Motion in Limine, supra note 80, 8.
90. See Matt Brady Bio, supra note 85.
91. See Special Verdict Form, Marist Coll. v. Brady, Index No. 5006/2009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 5. 2012) [hereinafter Special Verdict Form] (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
92. Marist's Verified Complaint, supra note 8 1 ' 18; see also JMU Selects Matt Brady as
New Men's Basketball Coach, COLONIAL ATHLETIC ASS'N (Mar. 25, 2008), http://ww. caasports.
comnView Article.dbmlDB OEM ID=8500&ATCLTD=1418992 (reporting that Matt Brady
selected as new JMU coach).
93. See Men s Basketball 2008 2009. MAACSPORTS.COM. http://www.maacsports.com/
staindings/Standings.dbmlSPID= 10446&DB OEM ID=17400&DEFFY=2008 (last visited Oct.
16, 2012) [hereinafter MAAC Standings 2008 2009].
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place finish); 94 and in 2010-2011 was 6-27 (3-15 conference record, last-place
finish).9 5
Marist's basketball program lost both stability and coaching continuity
immediately after Brady's departure, having lost its head coach and assistant
coaches, as well as its incoming recruiting class.96 Further, as I explained in my
damages report:
Marist lost the value and goodwill associated with program stability and
success that was created by Marist's substantial economic investment in
Brady. In addition, Marist lost the opportunity to capitalize on the
favorable publicity, reputation and goodwill that comes with having a
successful basketball program. It was [reasonably] foreseeable to
[Brady when he entered into the contract with Marist] that Marist would
be damaged by the loss of that opportunity if [he] unilaterally terminated
his contract [and left for another institution during the contract term].
The damages would be greatly enhanced if [he left] during the first year
of the contract term. The determination of Marist's damages required
an assessment, to a reasonable degree of certainty, of the value of the
loss of Brady for the remainder of the contract term, utilizing a reliable
methodology supported by the best evidence available according to
industry standards. 9 7
Applying the theory discussed above,98 I based my opinion on evidence of
liquidated damages amounts (1) contained in the contracts of head coaches (a) in
the same sport, (b) at comparable schools, and (c) with comparable coaches'
salaries, and (2) that would have been paid to the comparable school had the
comparable coach left in the same year of the contract term that Brady left
Marist.99 To assist in my analysis, I obtained and reviewed the contracts of head
men's basketball coaches in NCAA "mid-major" Division I conferences with a
2010-2011 conference Rating Percentage Index (RPI) 100 comparable to that of

94. See Men's Basketball 2009 2010, MAACSPORTS.COM, http://ww.maacsports.com/
standings/Standings.dbnl?SPID=10446&DB OEM ID=17400&DEF FY=2009 (last visited Oct.
16, 2012) [hereinafter MAAC Standings 2009 2010].
95. See Men's Basketball 2010 2011, MAACSPORTS.COM, http://ww.maacsports.com/
standings/Standings.dbmlSPID= 10446&DB OEM ID=17400&DEFFY=2010 (last visited Oct.
16, 2012) [hereinafter MAAC Standings 2010 2011].
96.

ANALYSIS OF DAMAGES, supra note 81, at 7.

97. Id. at 7-8 (citing Ne. Univ. v. Brown, 17 Mass. L. Rptr. No. 19, 443 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Mar. 11,2004)).
98. See supra Part III.A.
99. See ANALYSIS OFDAMAGES, supra note 81, at 9.
100. See id. at 10; NCAA BB Overall Power Rtg Conference Ratings 2010 2011, NCAA
BASKETBALL POWER RATINGS (Apr. 5, 2011). http://www.teamrankings.com/ncaa-basketball.
ranking/overall-power-ranking-by -conf [hereinafter NCAA BB Conference Ratings]. The RPI is a
system by which NCAA basketball teams are ranked based upon a team's wins, losses, and strength
of schedule. See Rating Percentage Index (RPI), NCAA, http://ww.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/
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the MAAC. which had a 99.2 conference rating.101
Those mid-major
conferences included the Colonial Athletic Association (CAA) (103.1 rating),
Conference USA (CUSA) (103.1 rating), Horizon League (102.5 rating),
Missouri Valley Conference (MVC) (102.3 rating), Western Athletic Conference
(WAC) (101.1 rating), Mid-American Conference (MAC) (97.8 rating), Atlantic
Sun Conference (97.5 rating), Big West Conference (97 rating), Summit League
(96.3 rating), Ohio Valley Conference (95.7 rating), and Sun Belt Conference
(95.7 rating).102 Thirty-six of the approximately fifty-five contracts I reviewed
contained liquidated damages clauses. o
Because Brady left during the first year of what was nearly a four-year
contract term, for each comparable contract, I determined and charted the
damages that would have been paid to the college or university had the coach left
during the first year of the contract term. This data, for all thirty-six contracts, is
contained in the chart in Appendix A.
Next. I "calculated the mean [liquidated] damages for all [thirty-six]
comparable contracts if the coach had left in the first year of the contract term,
which [was] $286,166."'04 I found that:
The damages owed pursuant to many of the liquidated damages clauses
[in comparable contracts] is greatest when the coach leaves early during
the contract term and the damages decline if the coach leaves later
during the contract term. As an example, the liquidated damages clause
in Article VIII of Brady's contract with JMU provides for damages in
the amount of $500,000 if Brady leaves in the first or second year and
$250,000 if he leaves in the third year. This reflects the parties'
understanding of the importance of the substantial investment being
made by the school and the long term commitment from both parties, as

public/NCAA/Chanpionships/NCAA+Rating+Percentage+Iidex/ (last updated Oct. 3, 2012). The
NCAA has used this system since the early 1980s "to aid in the selecting and seeding of the teams
[for] the 65-team men's [tournament] ... [and] for the 64-team women's tournament since its
inception in 1982." See Ratings PercentageIndex, CHN COLLEGE BASKETBALL, http://www.college
hoopsnet.com/history/ratingspercentageindex.htm (last updated May 2005). In its current
formulation, the index comprises a team's winning percentage (25%), its opponents' strength of
schedule (50%o), and the strength of schedule of those opponents' opponents (25%). Id. A team's
strength of schedule accounts for 75% of the RPI calculation and is "2/3 [its] opponents' winning
percentage and 1/3 times its opponents' opponents' winning percentage."
See RP1 FAQ,
COLLEGERPL.COM, http://www.collegerpi.comirpifaq.html (last updated Dec. 11, 2007).
101. NCAA BB Conference Ratings, supra note 100.
102. Id.
103. See infra app. I was unable to obtain and review the head coaches' contracts of schools
in the MAAC because the schools refused to comply with my FOLA request; as private institutions,
they are not required to make their coaches' contracts available to the public.
104. ANALYSIS OF DAMAGES, supra note 81, at II.
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well as an understanding that the school tends to be harmed to a greater
extent the earlier the coach leaves during the term of the contract. 1
The earlier a departure occurs in the contract term, the more disruptive it is on
the athletic program because of the detrimental effect the coaching transition can
have on continuity within a program from a coaching. management, and
recruiting standpoint.106
The thirty-six comparable contracts also evidence a relationship between the
amount of the coach's base salary and the amount of liquidated damages; the
greater the coach's base, the greater the liquidated damages. The scatterplot
graph in Figure 1 shows a positive relationship between the coach's base salary
and the liquidated damages amount that would be owed to the school if the coach
left in the first year of the contract term.Io0

105. Id. (citing Head Coach Employment Contract Between James Madison University and
Matt Brady (Mar. 26, 2008) [hereinafter Brady JMU Contract] (on file with South CarolinaLaw
Review)).
106. See Karcher,supra note I, at 53.
107. See infra Figure 1.
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Additionally, I calculated the mean liquidated damages of those contracts in
which the coach's included base salary was similar to that of Brady's. This
calculation was made using a salary range of $150,000 to $250,000-$50,000
above and below Brady's included base salary at the time he departed Marist for
JMU 108 -which reduced the number of comparable contracts from thirty-six to
eighteen. 109 The mean liquidated damages amount for these eighteen contracts,
assuming the coach had left in the first contract year, was $300,218.no This
figure is fairly consistent with the mean for all thirty-six of the contracts,
representing an approximate $14,000 variance. I Therefore, I concluded that a
reasonable approximation of Marist's damages was likely to be within the range
of $286,166 to $300,218.'

108. Brady Marist Contract Extension, supra note 82, at 5.
109. ANALYSIS OF DAMAGES, supra note 81. at 11.

110. See id at 11-12.
111. Id. at 12.
112. Id.
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Marist settled its tortious interference claim against JMU a few days before
the trial started, which left only the breach of contract claim against Brady.
Brady filed a pre-trial motion in limine with the court to preclude my proffered
testimony at trial on two grounds. 4
First, Brady argued that Marist was not claiming a breach of the contract's
exclusivity provision. 1 Brady asserted that my analysis assessed the damages
incurred by reason of the loss of his services for the remainder of the contract
term-which included the lost opportunity to benefit from a successful
basketball program-but that Marist "never alleged or claimed in [the] case that
the mere fact of Coach Brady's departure constituted a breach of his contract"
(i.e., a breach of the exclusivity provision).
The motion proclaimed that
"Maristpermitted Coach Brady to depart his employment at Marist and engage
in his employment at James Madison University," and that the only breach
alleged by Marist was breach of a provision in the contract whereby Brady
agreed that, in the event of such a permitted departure, he would end all contact
with Marist recruits and would not offer a scholarship to a current Marist player
or a player being recruited to play at Marist. 1 Brady thus argued that
"[d]amages, if any, must be somehow linked to the actionable conduct: the
alleged recruitment of so-called 'Marist recruits."' 1 Marist countered, stating
that the contract expressly provided that "in the event Brady seeks permission to
leave his position with Marist to accept another coaching position prior to the
end of his contract term, any permission granted by Marist is conditional upon
Brady's agreement 'to end any further contact with program recruits'[-a]
condition that Brady unquestionably breached."'l 1 9
Second, Brady argued in his motion that my proffered testimony was "based
upon a liquidated damages clause which does not exist in the operative contract
between Marist College and Coach Brady" and, therefore, liquidated damages
"ought not to be permitted to be considered by the jury to have been 'fairly
within the contemplation of the parties at the time that [the contract] was

113. See Peter Vieth, JMUSettles Lawsuit over Basketball Coach Hire, THE VLW BLOG (Apr.
27, 2012), http://valawyersweeldy.com/vI wblog/2012/04/27/jmu-settles-lawsuit-over-basketball-coach
-hire/.
114. Affirmation ( 6, Marist Coll. v. Brady, Index No. 5006/2009 (N.Y. Sup. CL Apr. 27,
2012) [hereinafter Brady's Motion in Limine].
115. See id 1 7 (quoting Marist's Verified Complaint, supra note 81, ' 20).
116. Id. 5 8 (citing ANALYSIS OF DAMAGES, supra note 81, at 8-9).
117. See id. : 8-9.
118. Id 10.
119. See Opposition to Motion in Limine. supra note 80, f 11-12 (emphasis added) (quoting
Brady Marist Contract Extension, supra note 82). Thus, Marist argued that it specifically pled in
the complaint that when Brady left for JMU, Marist had advised JMU that "[it] would grant Brady
permission to terminate his position as head basketball coach at Marist only if and so long as Brady
and [JMU] abided by all provisions of the Contract relating to Brady's obligations to have no
contact with or solicitation of current Marist men's basketball players and all Marist men's
basketball team recruits." Id. 15 (quoting Marist's Verified Complaint, supra note 81,' 17).
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made."' 120 Under the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale,12 1 however, it is not a
liquidated damages provision that must have been fairly within the
contemplation of the parties, but rather it is the economic loss.12 Brady's
argument here (1) disregarded the fact that liquidated damages clauses in
coaches' contracts compensate the school for consequential damages and (2)
implicitly asserted that Marist was not entitled to consequential damages because
he and Marist had not agreed to a liquidated damages clause. Marist argued in
its opposition to the motion in limine that courts have acknowledged "it is
reasonable to establish the value of an asset by expert opinion based upon the
value of comparable assets" and that "[there is no New York case law
forbidding such comparisons when establishing the value of a collegiate athletic
program.
Marist further argued that "[t]hese comparable liquidated damages
clauses represent the value comparable schools assign to their comparable
collegiate basketball programs and provide an accurate measure of the loss these
schools expect to incur as the result of the early departure of a coach in violation
of the contract." 1
At the start of trial, the judge granted Brady's motion in limine to preclude
my testimony. Unfortunately, we do not have the benefit of the judge's
reasoning, because no explanation was provided and no written opinion was

120. See Brady's Motion in Limine, supra note 114,
I I 13, 15 (quoting Goodstein Constr.
Corp. v. City of New York, 80 N.Y.2d 366. 373 (1992) (citations omitted)). Brady further argued
that "Professor Karcher should not be permitted to testify that liquidated damages clauses in other
contracts, which are neither in evidence nor relevant to these parties' agreement, can form any basis
for analysis of Marist's purported damages in this case." Id. 15.
121. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145; 9 Ex. 341. Brady acknowledged that the Hadley v. Baxvendale
rule for consequential damages was applicable in this case. Brady's Motion in Limine, supra note
114,
13 ("Under the accepted rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, it must be shown that the particular
damages were fairly within the contemplation of the parties to the contract at the time it was made."
(citations omitted) (quoting Goodstein Constr. Corp., 80 N.Y.2d at 373) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
122. See id. at 151; 9 Ex. at 355. Interestingly, Brady's original contract with Marist (before
the extension was entered into) had a liquidated damages clause which stated: "The parties
acknowledge that the College will incur administrative, recruiting, resettlement and other costs in
obtaining a replacement coach in addition to potentially increased compensation costs and loss of
ticket, broadcastor other revenues, which damages are impossible to determine with certainty and
accordingly agree to this liquidated damages provision. The parties further agree that the liquidated
damages provided for herein are reasonable in amount and not a penalty." Contract of Employment
Between Marist College and Matthew Brady 4 (Apr. 27, 2004) (emphasis added) (on file with South
CarolinaLaw Review). The foregoing demonstrates that it was. in fact, foreseeable to Brady that
Marist would be damaged if lie breached-by "loss of ticket, broadcast or other revenues." Id.
Moreover, in the original contract, Brady agreed that the amount of damages that would be
reasonable to cover Marist's economic loss if he left in the first year of the contract term was two
times his annual base salary (Base of $115,000; Liquidated Damages of $230,000). Id. at 4. 5.
123. Opposition to Motion in Limine, supra note 80, 57.
124. Opposition to Motion in Limine, supra note 80, ' 57; see also Stewart 1. Edelstein,
Daubert and Lost-Profits Testimony, TRIAL, Sept. 2005, at 31 ("[E]xpert testimony is admissible if
the expert is qualified to testify on the topic at issue, the testimony will assist the trier of fact, and
the expert's methodology is sufficiently reliable.").
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rendered. Marist proffered the testimony of two accountants. James Markham
and Chad Staller, "who issued a joint report analyzing Marist's damages on
behalf of The Center for Forensic Economic Studies."
Their study contained
three categories of economic damage: (1) "Marist's loss of the costs of recruiting
the 2008 recruits," which was "based upon a determination of the amount of time
Brady and each [assistant coach] spent on recruitment efforts for that year as a
percentage of their respective salaries for that year";6 (2) "Marist's increased
cost for replacing assistant coaches ... whom Brady convinced to follow him to
JMU"; and (3) "Marist's decreased ticket revenue from the men's basketball
games" by comparing ticket revenue "for the season immediately prior to
Brady's departure to the [ticket] revenue ... for the
three seasons remaining on
128
Brady's contract term subsequent to [the] breach."
IV. CONCLUSION

The j ury returned a verdict that Brady had breached his contract with Marist,
but that Marist was not damaged financially. 9 Because jury verdicts have no
legal precedential value and cannot be cited as legal authority,
it is not
necessary to speculate as to how or why this particular jury concluded that
Marist was not damaged at all when its basketball team's win-loss record went
from 62-33 (during the three seasons prior to the coach's breach)
to 17-79
(during the three seasons subsequent to the breach).13 When a majority of
schools and their coaches are in agreement, pre-breach, that the school is
financially damaged when the coach breaches the exclusivity provision, and a

125. Opposition to Motion in Limine, supra note 80,

126. Id. f 22-23.

21.

127. Id. ff 22, 31.
128. Id.
22, 33. Marist explained that I was retained to provide an alternative basis for
Marist's calculation of its consequential damages for consideration by the jury:
Karcher's method of calculating Marist's consequential damages from Brady's breach is
intended to provide the trier of fact with an alternative basis for calculating Marist's
consequential damages in place of the increased costs of assistant coaches and loss of
ticket revenue calculated by Markham and Staller. Karcher's calculation of damages is
not intended to replace Marist's general damages of the costs of recruiting in 2008, which
Marist is entitled to regardless of which method is utilized to calculate Marist's
consequential damages.
Id. J 44 n.1.
129. Special Verdict Form, supra note 91; Associated Press, Jury: JMU Coach Brady
Breached Marist Contract, NCAA MEN'S BASKETBALL (May 9, 2012, 1:11 PM),
http://collegebasketball.ap.org/article/jury-jmu-coach-brady -breached-marist-contract.
130. See, e.g., Catherine Albiston, The Ride of Law and the Litigation Process: The Paradox
of Losing by 4inning, 33 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 869, 878 (1999) ("Jury verdicts usually do not
produce judicial opinions and therefore do not become part of the persuasive or binding judicial
authority .).. . ).
131. llatt Brady Bio, supra note 85.
132. See MAAC Standings 2008 2009, supra note 93; MAAC Standings 2009 2010, supra
note 94; MAAC Standings 2010 2011, supra note 95.
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particular school experiences the loss of a successful and stable athletic program
after such breach actually occurs, we can be fairly confident from a causation
standpoint in saying it is more likely than not that the breach, in fact, causes
some amount of economic damage.
That amount can be assessed with
"reasonable certainty" by determining what a reasonable (or average) liquidated
damages amount would be if the school and breaching coach had included it in
the contract pre-breach. The methodology proposed in this Essay is a malleable
formula for assessing a school's "difficult to ascertain" damages post-breach,
and its reliability is substantiated by the formula's universal acceptance by
similarly-situated contracting parties pre-breach.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

23

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 7
[VOL. 64: 429

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

452

APPENDIX: COMPARABLE CONTRACTS

Coach
(Date of
Contract)
Mike Davis
(Apr. 7,
2006) -

School
University
of Alabama
at
Birmingham

Conference USA

$500,000;
5-yr. term

$500,000

Damages in
First Year of
Contract
$500,000

Western Athletic
Conference

$400,000;
5-yr. term

$250,000

$250,000

Colonial Athletic
Association

$325,000:
5-yr term

$375,000 in fist yr., reduced
by $75,000 per yr for
remainder ofterm; plus
coach shall cause new school
to contract with VCU for a
2
-xr. home/home series with

$375,000
plu 2 -yr
home/home
series contract
with $250000
huxyout

lid-American
Conference

$320,000;
7-yr. term

$320,000 in s yr. if coach
accepts employment at
another institution following
first Frida after NCAA
tourmeaent and prior to first
season game. If
coach accepts emplo ment
between first regulai season
game and first rida after
NCAA tournament then
$300o000 in first yr ;
$250,000 in second yr.;

$320,000;
Plus
additional
$300,000 if
coach accepts
other
employment
at any time
hetAseen the
first regular
season game
and the first

$200,000 in third yr.;

Friday after

Conference

Base
Salary

Liquidated Damages

(UAB)

Mark Fox
(July 1.
2006)134
Shaka Smart
(May 1,
2009)135

University
of Nevada,
Reno
Virginia
Commonwealth
University
(VCU)

buout

___________$250,000

eith
Damhrot
(Mac 4,
2010) *See
below for
Damhroths
prex ios
contract 136

Unmxersity
of Akron

Uegular

133. Employment Agreement Between the University of Alabama at Birmingham and Mike
Davis (Apr. 7 2006) (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
134. Employment Agreement Between the University of Nevada, Reno and Mark L. Fox (July
I, 2006) (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
135. Employment Agreement Between Virginia Commonwealth University and Shaka D.
Smart (May 1, 2009) (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
136. Employment Contract Between the University of Akron and Keith Dambrot (May 4,
20 10) (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
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Ricardo
Patton (Mar.

Northern
Illinois

19,2007)137

University

Matt Brady
(Mar. 26,
2008)1

James
Madison
University

Mid-American
Conference

$300,000;
5-yr. term

453

$150,000 in fourth yr.;
$100,000 in fifth yr.;
$50,000 in sixth yr.; and
$50,000 in final yr.
An amount equal to base
multiplied by number of yrs.

the NCAA
Nat'l
Championship
game
$1,200,000
plus any

remaining plus any base

remaining

remaining for current yr.

base in first
yr.
$500,000

Colonial Athletic
Association

$290,000;
5-yr. term

$500,000 in first or second
yr.; $250,000 in third yr.

Wichita
State
University

Missouri Valley
Conference

$277,500;
5-yr. term

$275,000

$275,000

Kenneth
McDonald
(Jan. 13,
2009)140

Western
Kentucky
University
(WKU)

Sun Belt
Conference

$250,000;
4-yr. rolling
term

$300,000 in any yr.; plus
coach agrees to a 4-yr.
home/home series between
WKU and new school

$300,000 plus
4-yr.
home/home
series

Gene Ford
(Apr. 1,

Kent State
University

Mid-American
Conference

$250,000;
5-yr. term

Ohio
University

Mid-American
Conference

$250,000;
5-yr. term

(3M U)

Gregg
Marshall
(June 20,
2007, as
amended
May 19.
2010) 39

2010)141

John Groce
(Apr. 1,

An amount equal to base and
supplemental, multiplied by
1 the number ofyrs. remaining
$400,000 in first yr.;
$300,000 in second yr;

$1,200,000

$400,000

137. Employment Agreement Between Northern Illinois University and Ricardo Patton (Mar.
18, 2007) (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
138. Brady JMU Contract, supra note 105.
139. Second Amendment to Contract for Employment of Men's Head Basketball Coach
Between Wichita State University and Gregg Marshall (May 19, 2010) (on file with South Carolina
Law Review) (citing First Amendment to Contract for Employment of Men's lead Basketball
Coach Between Wichita State University and Gregg Marshall (Apr. 23, 2009) (on file with South
Carolina Law Review); Contract for Employment of Men's Head Basketball Coach Between
Wichita State University and Gregg Marshall (June 20, 2007) (on file with South Carolina Law
Review )).
140. Western Kentucky University Athletic Employment Contract Between Western Kentucky
University and Kenneth M. McDonald (Jan. 13, 2009) (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
141. Employment Contract Between Gene A. Ford and Kent State University (Apr. I, 2010)
(on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
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$250,000 in third yr.;

2010) 1421

Gary Waters
(Sept. 12,
2006)l43

Cleveland
State
University

Horizon League

$225,000;
5-yr. rolling
term

William
Kennedy
(July 1,
2010)144

Murray State
University

Ohio Valley
Conference

$225,000;
4-yr. term

Christopher
Lowery (July
1, 2007)

Southern
Illinois
University
Carbondale
(SIUC)
UNC
Wilmington
(UNCW)

Missouri Valley
Conference

$216,300;
7-yr. term

Colonial Athletic
Association

Georgia
State

Colonial Athletic
Association

$200,000
5-yr term
with
$10000
annual
increases.
$200,000;
5-yr. term

Colonial Athletic
Association

Mid-American

Robert
"Buzz"
Peterson
(Apr. 16
2010) 146
Rodrick
Barnes (July

1.,2007) 147wniversity
Joseph
Tow son
Kennedy
University
(July 1,
2006)146
Keith
UGoersi

$200,000 in fourth yr.; and
$150,000 in fifth yr.
$400,000 with more than 4
yrs. remaining; $300,000
with less than 4 yrs. but
more than 2 yrs. remaining;
$225,000 with less than 2
yrs. remaimng
$50,000 if coach leaves for
school in Big 12, Big Ten,
SEC, ACC, Big East, Pac-10
or OVC; $20,000 if he
leaves for school in any
other conference
$400,000 before June 30,
2010; $250,000 between
July 1, 2010 and June 30,
2012; $50,000 between July
1, 2012 and June 30, 2014
$500,000 in first yr;
$400,000 in second yr;
$300,000 in thhd yr.:
$200,000 in fourth yr; and
$0 fifth yr.

$400,000

$20,000

$400,000

$500,000

$500,000

200,000
5-yr. term

$500,000 in first yr.;
$331,500 in second yr.; and
yrs.
$166,500 in final three
Amount equal toAnnual
Base Salary

$200,000;

If during any contract yr.

$200,000

$200000

142. Head Coach Employment Agreement Between Ohio University and John Groce (Mar. 3.
2009) (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).

143. Employment Agreement Between Gary Waters and Cleveland State University (Sept. 12,
2006) (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
144. Offer of Employment Between Murray State University and William Kennedy (Mar. 30,
2010) (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
145. Employment Agreement Between Southern Illinois University Carbondale and
Christopher M. Lowery (Apr. 4, 2007) (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
146. Employment Agreement Between the University of North Carolina at Wilmington and
Robert "Buzz" Peterson (Apr. 16, 2010) (on file with South Carolina Law Review).
147. Employment Agreement Between Georgia State University Athletic Association and
Rodrick K. Barnes (July 1, 2007) (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
148. Contract Extension Agreement Between Towson University and Joseph P. Kennedy (July
I, 2006) (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
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Dambrot
(July 1.
2007)14

of Akron

Conference

7-yr. term

Stephen
Hawkins
(May 1,

Western
Michigan
University

Mid-American
Conference

$191,000;
5-yr. term

2008)1
Billy Taylor
(Aug. 8,
2007)151

Ball State
University

Mid-American
Conference

Annual base for the yr. in
which the termination occurs

$182,000

UC Santa
Barbara

Big West
Conference

$182,000;
5-yr. term;
with min.
$5,000 ann.
increases
$180,270;
4-yr. term

An amount equal to 65% of
annual salary

$126,925
(65% of Base
plus $15,000
stipend for
public
relations

University

Mid-American

$176,685;

$100,000 prior to April 30,

Robert
Williams
(Apr. 1,
2008)152

coach accepts employment
at another school after April
7 and before the first regular
season game, then $200,000.
If coach accepts other
employment between first
regular season game and
April 7: $200,000 in first yr.;
$175,000 in second yr.;
$150,000 in third yr.;
$125,000 in fourth yr.;
$100,000 in fifth yr.;
$75,000 in sixth yr.;
$50,000 in seventh yr.
$150,000 in first two yrs.;
$100,000 in final three yrs.

$150,000

duties)

iPhillip R.

$100,000

149. Employment Contract Between the University of Akron and Keith Dambrot (July 1,
2007) (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
150. Western Michigan University Full-Time Head Coach Employment Agreement with
Stephen Hawkins (May 1, 2008) (on file with South Carolina Law Review).
151. Letter and Terms of Employment Between Ball State University and William Taylor
(Aug. 16, 2007) (on file with South Carolina Law Review).
152. Employment Agreement for a Contract Appointment Between the Regents of the
University of California and Robert A. Williams (Apr. 1,2008) (on file with South Carolina Law
Review).
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Witherspoon
(May 1,
2009)15
Brad
Greenberg
(Apr. 1,
2009)154
Ernie Zeigler
(July 1,
2010)155

of Buffalo

Conference

5-yr. term

2012; $75,000 after April 30,
2012

Radford
University

Big South
Conference

$176,000;
6-yr. term

$100,000 in first four yrs.

$100,000

Central
Michigan
University

Mid-American
Conference

$175,446;
4-yr. term

$500,000

Ron Hunter
(June 22,
1999, as
amended
May 1,

Indiana
University
Purdue
University
Indianapolis
(IUPUI)

Summit League

$165,000;
7-yr. term

$500,000 in first yr.;
$250,000 in second yr.;
$125,000 in third yr.;
$75,000 in final yr.
$25,000

University
of Northern
Iowa

Missouri Valley
Conference

$159,306;
7-yr. term
with
$20,000
annual
increases

$100,000

$100,000

2008)l56
Ben
Jacobson
(July 1,
2009)157

$25,000

153. Employment Agreement Between the University at Buffalo and Phillip R. Witherspoon
(May 1, 2011) (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
154. Employment Contract Between Radford University and Brad Greenberg (Apr. 1, 2009)
(on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
155. Contract Between Central Michigan University and Ernie Zeigler (Apr. 13, 2010) (on file
with South Carolina Law Review).
156. Employment Agreement Between Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis
and Ronald E. Hunter, Jr. (June 22, 1999) (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review), amended by
Second Addendum Between Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis and Ronald E.
Hunter, Jr. (Aug. 31, 2007) (on file with South Carolina Law Review) and Third Addendum to
Employment Agreement Between Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis and Ronald
E. Hunter, Jr. (Apr. 25, 2008) (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
157. University of Northern Iowa Contract of Employment with Ben Jacobson (June 26, 2009)
(on file with South Carolina Law Review).
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Cuonzo
Martin (Apr.
1, 2008, as
amended
June 18,
2010)58

Missouri
State
University

Missouri Valley
Conference

$140,000;
7-yr. term

$250,000 on or before April
1 2011; decreases by
$50,000 every April 1
thereafter

$250,000

Murrav
Bartow (July
1, 2009)

East
Tennessee
State
University
(ETSU)

Atlantic Sun
Conference

$140,000;
5-yr. term

If coach leaves for midmajor program, coach shall
require hiring institution to
pay $75,000; if coach goes
to a big six conference or a
Conference USA school,
coach shall require hiring
institution to pay $150,000

$75,000

Matthew
Driscoll
(Apr. 9,

University
of North
Florida
(NF)
Eastern
Michigan
University

Atlantic Sun
Conference

$135,000;
5-yr. term

Base salary for number of
yrs. remaining in term

$540,000

Mid-American
Conference

$130,000;
rolling 4-yr.
term

An amount equal to two
months of annual salary

$21,667

University
of Missouri
Kansas City

Summit League

$130,000;
4-yr. term

In first yr., 1/4 of thencurrent base; in second yr.,
1/8 of then-current base; in
third yr., 1/16 of then-current
base; and in final yr., $0

$32,500

2009)160
Charles
Ramsey
(Apr. 1,
2005) 161

Matthew
Brown (May
1,2009)162

158. Employment Contract Between Missouri State University and Cuonzo Martin (June 20,
2008) (on file with South Carolina Law Review), amended by First Addendum to Employment
Contract Between Missouri State University and Cuonzo Martin (June 18, 2010) (on file with South
CarolinaLaw Review).
159. Head Men's Basketball Coaching Contract Between East Tennessee State University and
Murray Bartow (July 10, 2009) (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
160. Employment Agreement Between the University of North Florida and Matthew Driscoll
(Apr. 9, 2009) (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
161. Eastern Michigan University Athletic Coach Employment Agreement with Charles
Ramsey (Aug. 2. 2005) (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
162. Contract For Employment Between the University of Missouri Kansas City and Matthew
Brown (Aug. 21, 2009) (on file with South Carolina Law Review).
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Saul Phillips
(July 1.
2008)

North
Dakota State
University

Summit League

$121,900;
5-yr. term
with 4o
ann
increase

One yr. of then-current base
salary

$121,900

Donnie
Tyndall
(Apr. 10,
2006)164

Morehead
State
University

Ohio Valley
Conference

$120,000;
4-yr. term

$108,000;
plus 2 -yr.
home/home
series

Tyler Geving
(Apr. 15.
2009)l65

Portland
State
University

Big Sky
Conference

Edward
Payne (Aut
4, 2006) 16

University
of South
Carolina

Atlantic Sun
Conference

$112,008;
4-yr. term
with $5,000
approx.
ann.
increase
$88,000; 5yr. term

$100,000; plus a reasonable
fee to reclaim institutional
funds spent on recruited
players who leave (not to
exceed $2,000 per player);
plus coach agrees to a 2-yr.
home/home series
$50,000

50% of annual base salary
for the remaining term

$176,000

$43,000

$50,000

Upstate

Roger Reid
(Mar. 28,
2007)167

Southern
Utah
University

Summit League

$86,000; 5yr. term

Dane Fife

Indiana

Summit League

$80,000; 6-

In first 2 yrs., 50% of thencurrent annual base salary; in
third yr., 45% of thencurrent base; in fourth yr.,
35% of then-current base: in
fifth yr., $0
Number of months

(Apr. 1,

University-

yr. tern

remaining on term

2007) 168

Purdue
University

multiplied by then-current
base monthly salary

Fort Wayne

($80,000 max.)

$80,000

163. Employment Agreement Between North Dakota State University and Saul Phillips (July
I , 2008) (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
164. Memorandum of Agreement Between Morehead State University and Donnie Tyndall
(Apr. 10, 2006) (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
165. Employment Agreement Between Portland State University and Tyler Geving (Aug. 19,
2009) (on tile with South CarolinaLaw Review).
166. Employment Agreement Between the University of South Carolina Upstate and Edward
G. Payne (Aug. 4, 2006) (on file with South CarolinaLaw Review).
167. Contract for Employment Between Southern Utah University and Roger Reid (Mar. 28,
2007) (on tile with South CarolinaLaw Review).
168. Employment Agreement Between Indiana University-Purdue University Fort Wayne and
Dane Fife (Apr. 1, 2005) (on file with South Carolina Law Review), amended by Addendum to
Agreement Between Indiana University Purdue University Fort Wayne and Dane Fife (Mar. 23,
2007) (on tile with South CarolinaLaw Review).
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